Wars In Afghanistan And Iraq Through The Eyes Of Machiavelli

Scott Savitz, a senior engineer at the RAND Corporation generally focuses and writes on how to improve the effectiveness and resilience of operational forces through the use of new technologies and modified tactics, but this time he draws attention to the social perspective of war. He recommends two books to US Administration to take into account; Machiavelli’s best-known work “The Prince”, and “Discourses on Livy”.
Unfortunately, the exit of the US army from both countries cannot be called as a victory. As Obama said; “I think Americans have learned that it’s harder to end wars than it is to begin them.”
If Machiavelli, statesman and military strategist, were alive today, how would he evaluate the US course of action in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars? The guidelines, written in the 15th century by him, are obviously still valid.
First; Do not trust the diaspora. It’s risky to believe the promises of exiles who offer to help an outside power take over their native countries since these individuals inevitably have their own agendas. Their characterization of the situation within their country may be effected by their own hopes of return and by their hunger to overthrow the existing government. That will mislead you. Bush administration’s interactions with Ahmad Chalabi, Iraqi National Congress leader, before the 2003 invasion of Iraq is an example. He and other exiles lied about Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs but also told that invading American forces would be greeted by the Iraqi people. Then he confessed to lying. Maybe, members of the Bush administration may have wanted to believe that but the result was failure.
Second; Never get into war with few soldiers! Machiavelli warned leaders against using an inadequate number of forces and he recommended the use of an overwhelming force to ensure that wars last shorter. Small numbers of forces at the beginning in both Afghanistan and Iraq wars is an example to the failure due to inadequate number of soldiers.
Third; Keep the current system going! The US dissolved Iraqi government entities immediately after the invasion. Machiavelli advised that when reforming a state, at least some of parts of the prior government should be retained to make the required reforms. Even if you bring someone that you support to the administration, if you wipe the whole system, that will lead to great vacuum, job losses and resentment in the country. In addition, it would be extremely harder to reconstitute a new government.
The other lesson is; The importance of military geography! Machiavelli insisted that the commanders should acquire a detailed knowledge of geography and an understanding of how it influences military operations. The physical and human geography of Afghanistan are apparently underestimated by superpowers especially by the US. The mountainous terrain and harsh social structure, which they thought they could overcome with technology and intelligence, had for years given the Americans a hard time. Two hundred years ago, Britain and then the Soviets also took their share from the difficult conditions of the country. After England’s harsh experience, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once described the golden rule of politics: “Never invade Afghanistan.”

According to security experts, even if you think that you have a country like Afghanistan under control, it will not be possible to overcome the physical and human geography of the country. On the other hand, the complexity of Iraq’s human geography was completely beyond Americans’ understanding and categorized as a simple divide among Sunnis, Arabs, Shias, and Kurds. The tribal, factional, and ideological divides within these communities and the existence of numerous smaller minorities were largely ignored.
The last but not the least is; The Importance of Money. According to Afghanistan’s central bank chief, the Federal Reserve was holding $7 billion of the country’s assets. Whether the US will allow Taliban to access to this money is one of the hard questions to answer. The second question is how the USA and Europe will react about the mineral wealth of Afghanistan. A report by US military experts and geologists estimated that Afghanistan is sitting on nearly $1 trillion in mineral wealth, thanks to huge iron, copper, lithium, cobalt deposits. China is already in position to mine these minerals and one step forward. Should the USA and European countries recognize the Taliban and develop economic relations for these mines? Otherwise there is a risk of losing bigger slice of the cake to China.
Beijing has another worries. Could the war-torn country become a hideout for China’s minority Uyghur separatists and could its economic interests be plagued by instability in the country? Or could the Uyghurs be manipulated to undermine China’s mining operations?
Can any means be considered legitimate for the sake of interests? This seems to occupy the agenda in the near future as a question from Machiavelli to us.